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The  development  of  economic  activity  and  the  rise  in  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  in 
recent decades has prompted a great deal of research into the phenomenon of multinational 
companies.  A  vast  amount  of  empirical  literature  on  FDI  catalogues  a  long  list  of 
determinants that try to explain direct investment by multinational companies in a particular 
location, but it is noticeable that the results are not always consensual. This article provides a 
review of the theoretical approaches to and empirical studies on FDI in an attempt to single 
out the most robust factors for explaining the geographic distribution of FDI flows worldwide. 
It also suggests paths for future research in this area. 
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1.  Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is regarded as a factor that drives economic growth (Wang, 
2009). Many governments from developed and developing countries believe that FDI can 
help them get through stagnation and even circumvent the poverty trap (Brooks et al., 2010). 
In  this  context,  the  detailed  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  FDI  has  provided  invaluable 
information.  
Various  theories  have  been  developed  since  the  1960s  to  explain  FDI.  These  theories 
proclaim  a  number  of  determinants  that  could  explain  foreign  direct  investment  flows, 
involving  the  micro  (e.g.,  organisational  aspects)  and  macro  (e.g.,  resource  allocation) 
dimensions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). The micro dimension includes factors intrinsic to 
the company itself, such as ownership advantages, cost reduction and economies of scale, 
whereas  the  macro  dimension  concerns  market  specific  factors  such  as  barriers  to  entry, 
availability of resources, political stability, country risk and market size, among others (Faeth, 
2009). 
Several empirical studies have been published on the assessment of which key determinants 
explain  the  investment  of  multinational  firms  in  a  given  location  (macro  dimension). 
However,  there  is  no  general  agreement  insofar  as  some  studies  have  not  found  any 
statistically significant relation with respect to certain determinants. Our study thus uses a 
review of the theoretical approaches to FDI and published empirical studies to identify which 
factors have been found to be most robust in terms of attracting FDI to a specific country, and 
so explain the geographic distribution of FDI worldwide.   
The  article  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  briefly  describes  the  various  theoretical 
approaches  that  have  tried  to  explain  FDI  flows  over  the  years.  Section  3  identifies  the 
location  determinants  of  FDI  in  the  various  empirical  studies.  The  paper  ends  with 
conclusions and suggestions for future research, in Section 4.  
 
2.  Theoretical approaches to FDI 
The strong growth of international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) that we have 
witnessed in the past few decades (Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010) has inspired extensive 
research  on  the  behaviour  of  multinational  firms  and  determinants  of  FDI  (Faeth,  2006). 3 
 
Many  authors  (cf.  Table  1)  have  concentrated  on  the  issue  of  FDI  determinants  and  put 
forward various (and complementary) theories to explain them. 
As  Faeth  (2009)  highlights,  the  first  explanations  of  FDI  were  based  on  the  models 
propounded by Heckscher-Ohlin (1933) and MacDougall (1960) and Kemp (1964), referred 
to  as  the  MacDougall-Kemp  model,  according  to  which  FDI  was  motivated  by  higher 
profitability in foreign markets enjoying growth and lower labour costs and exchange risks. 
Table 1: Summary of theories of FDI determinants 
Theory/Theoretical 
approach  Determinants  Author(s) (year) 
Heckscher-Ohlin Model / 
MacDougall-Kemp Model 
Higher return on investment, lower labour 
costs, exchange risk 
Heckscher and Ohlin (1933), Hobson 
(1914), Jasay (1960), MacDougall (1960), 
Kemp (1964), Aliber (1970) 
Market imperfections  Ownership benefits (product differentiation), 
economies of scale, government incentives  Hymer (1976), Kindleberger (1969) 
Product differentiation  Imperfect competition  Caves (1971) 
Oligopoly markets  Following rivals, responding to competition 
in domestic market  Knickerbocker (1973) 
Product life cycle  Production function characteristics  Vernon (1966) 
Behaviour theory  Fear of loss of competitive edge, following 
rivals and increased competition at home  Aharoni (1966) 
Internalisation 
Market failures/inefficiencies   Buckley and Casson (1976) 
Know-how (leads to horizontal 
internalisation), market failures (leads to 
vertical internalisation) 
Hennart (1982, 1991), Teece (1981, 1985), 
Casson (1987) 
Eclectic paradigm (OLI – 
Ownership, location, 
internalisation) 
Benefit of owning productive processes, 
patents, technology, management skills 
Dunning (1977, 1979) 
Advantage of locating in protected markets, 
favourable tax systems, low production and 
transport costs, lower risk 
Advantage of internalisation cutting 
transaction costs, lowering risk of copying 
technology, quality control 
New theory of trade 
Market size  Dixit and Grossman (1982), Sanyal and 
Jones (1982), Krugman (1983), Helpman 
(1984, 1985), Markusen (1984), Ethier 
(1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987, 
1992), Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001, 
2005), Brainard (1993, 1997), Eaton and 
Tamura (1994), Ekholm (1998), Markusen 
and Venables (1998, 2000),  Zhang and 
Markusen (1999), Deardorff (2001) 
Transport costs 
Barriers to entry 
Factor endowments 
Institutional 
approach  Political variables 
Financial and economic 
incentives 
Root and Ahmed (1978), Bond and 
Samuelson (1986), Black and Hoyt (1989), 
Grubert and Mutti (1991), Rolfe et al. 
(1993), Loree and Guisinger (1995), 
Haaparanta (1996), Devereux and Griffith 
(1998), Haufler and Wooton (1999), 
Haaland and Wooton (1999, 2001), 
Mudambi (1999), Barros and Cabral 
(2001), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001), 
Hubert and Pain (2002) 
Tariffs 
Tax rate 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 4 
 
Authors  such  as  Hymer  (1976)
1  (in  Dunning,  1993)  and  Kindleberger  (1969)  (in  Cleeve, 
2008)  believe  that  there  must  be  imperfections  in  the  markets  for  goods  or  factors  of 
production for there to be FDI. Hymer (1976) also confirms that investment abroad involves 
high  costs  and  risks  inherent  to  the  drawbacks  faced  by  multinationals  because  they  are 
foreign.  These  include  the  cost  of  acquiring  information  due  to  cultural  and  language 
differences and the cost of less favourable treatment by the governments of host countries. 
The multinationals will thus have to have ownership advantages (e.g., innovative products, 
management skills, patents, and so forth) to offset the disadvantages (Dunning, 1993).  
In terms of ownership advantages, Caves (1971) focused his study on product differentiation 
in the belief that FDI has an advantage over export and licensing if product differentiation is 
based  on  the  knowledge.  Knickerbocker  (1973)  (in  Hill,  2007)  based  his  study  on  the 
relationship between FDI and the oligopoly rivalry between firms. He asserted that FDI flows 
reflect the strategic rivalry between companies in the global market as a result of reactive 
behaviour to the entry of competitors in certain markets. In other words, firms often have 
imitative behavior: they follow the internationalization of competitors so that they will not 
gain strategic advantage (Knickerbocker, 1973). 
But rivalry between firms also affects their decisions to cut production costs to become more 
competitive, which led Vernon (1966) to explore the theory of product life cycle. He found 
that firms choose to invest directly in a given place as an alternative to exporting, in so far as 
goods travel along the curve of their life cycle (growth, maturity and decline), and to the 
extent that as they decline they have fewer needs in terms of specialized labour and innovative 
technology. In the growth stage, companies invest in other developed countries where markets 
are growing and local production can be absorbed, while in the maturity and decline stages 
production  is  shifted  to  developing  countries  inasmuch  as  markets  become  saturated  and 
products are less innovative, thereby generating pressure to reduce costs (Hill, 2007). Aharoni 
(1966) (in Faeth, 2009) explained why companies opt for FDI through competition factors, 
such as the fear of loss of competitiveness, the need to follow rivals into foreign markets and 
increased competition in the domestic market. 
Internalisation  theory  was  first  broached  by  Buckley  and  Casson  (1976)  (in  Ietto-Gillies, 
2005),
2 who argued that firms choose to internalise operations through FDI when transaction 
                                                 
1 Hymer’s theory was only published in 1976 (after his death), even though it resulted from his PhD thesis, 
completed in1960 (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
2 As Ietto-Gillies notes (2005), internalisation theory dates back to Coase (1937) and his theory of the firm, but it 
was extended to international firms by Buckley and Casson (1976). 5 
 
costs (such as information and negotiation costs, arising from recourse to the market) are 
higher than internalisation costs (related to internal communication and organisation). When 
market risk and uncertainty are high then transaction costs are high, and internalisation of 
operations is preferred (undertaking FDI). Buckley and Casson (1976) (in Ietto-Gillies, 2005) 
also  consider  that  in  certain  markets  (e.g.,  markets  for  knowledge)  there  is  a  particularly 
strong incentive to internalise. The authors say  that knowledge is a public good within a 
company, and so it can be used in several corporate divisions at no extra cost, and is easy to 
transfer from  country to country. Furthermore,  a buyer’s problem in establishing the true 
value of the knowledge to be acquired makes its transaction on the market rather problematic. 
The  more  holistic  approach  of  Dunning,  the  eclectic  or  OLI  paradigm  embraces  the 
internalisation  theory  and  traditional  trade  theories  (Dunning,  2002),  and  systematises  the 
benefits for firms that operate internationally, connecting them to the chosen entry modes 
(Faeth, 2009). For Dunning (1977) (in Ietto-Gillies, 2005), there are advantages in choosing 
FDI  when  there  are  simultaneously  ownership  advantages  -  O,  location  advantages  -  L 
internalisation  advantages  -  I.  Ownership  advantage  concerns  the  importance  of  a  firm 
owning  assets  such  as  pioneering  technology,  exclusive  productive  processes,  patents, 
management skills and such like, that can generate profits in the future (Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). Location is important when a company gains from its presence in a given market by 
benefiting from conditions such as: special tax regimes; lower production and transport costs; 
market size; access to protected markets, and lower risk (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Market 
imperfections (e.g., the imbalance of international allocation of resources) can be reduced by 
internalising operations, allowing a reduction in transaction costs associated with  risks of 
copying  technology,  for  instance  (Dunning,  2002).  The  choice  of  a  particular  location  is 
therefore based on specific conditions that are in its favour (Ietto-Gillies, 2005).  
The major contribution of Dunning’s eclectic paradigm to the literature was to bring together 
several  complementary  theories,  identifying  a  set  of  variables  (ownership,  location  and 
internalisation) that shape the activities of multinational firms (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). 
The essence of this approach is the application of these variables to trade, to international 
production and to the international organisation of production, which means that the same 
analytical framework can cover the three main modes of internationalisation (exports, FDI 
and licensing) (Ietto-Gillies, 2005). 
Based on Kindleberger’s theoretical models (1969) along with those of Hymer (1976) and 
Caves (1971) (cited in Faeth, 2009), an alternative analytical framework emerges - a "new 6 
 
theory  of  trade"  -  that  combines  the  advantages  of  ownership  (knowledge)  and  location 
(market size and low transaction costs) with technology and the intrinsic characteristics of a 
country (factor endowments). This new theory is an addition to Dunning’s eclectic paradigm 
in that it aims to correlate the three variables OLI (ownership, location, internalisation) with 
technology and a country’s characteristics in a coherent manner (Markusen, 2002). Several 
empirical studies have been published on this (e.g., Helpman, 1984, 1985; Markusen, 1984, 
1997, cited in Faeth, 2009). 
To  round  off  this  analysis  of  the  theoretical  models  we  should  explain  the  influence  of 
political variables on FDI, from the institutional standpoint. Institutional theory suggests that 
firms operate in a complex environment that is uncertain and sometimes confrontational, and 
so a company’s decisions will depend on the institutional forces that have an influence on it, 
especially on regulations and incentives (Francis et al., 2009). In this context, the strategies 
adopted by companies and their performance on international markets are largely determined 
by institutions, that is, by the “rules of the game” (Peng, 2009). Foreign investment can thus 
be regarded as a 'game’ in which the players are the multinational firm and the government of 
the  host  country,  or  as  a  contest  between  governments  to  attract  FDI  (Faeth,  2009). 
Government policies that include tax breaks, subsidies and easy repatriation of capital (Faeth, 
2009) can thus influence the choice between exporting, FDI and licensing. This issue has been 
examined by a number of authors, such as Bond and Samuelson (1986), Black and Hoyt 
(1989) and Hubert and Pain (2002) (in Faeth, 2009), who have concluded that financial and 
fiscal incentives, tariffs and lower corporate tax rates have positive effect on attracting FDI 
(Faeth, 2009). Corruption is another, equally important, factor in firms' decisions to opt for a 
particular place. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) and Cleeve (2008) are among those authors who 
say that low levels of corruption are linked to greater prosperity and have a considerable 
influence on the institutional quality of a country, and stimulate its development. 
All in all, the various theories on FDI set out a number of determinants that could explain 
foreign direct investment flows, involving the micro (e.g., organisational aspects) and macro 
(e.g., resource allocation) dimensions (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Since this work aims to 
identify the factors that have been found to best explain FDI flows to a particular location, it 




3.  Determinants of FDI: empirical evidence 
3.1. Initial considerations 
At first on an a-theoretical basis (Robinson, 1961; Behrman, 1962; Basi, 1966, cited in Faeth, 
2009), and afterwards inserted into the theoretical approaches to FDI (cf. Section 2), several 
empirical studies have been undertaken in order to assess which key determinants explain the 
investment of multinational firms in a given location. 
Adapting the organisation of the determinants in the relevant theoretical approaches described 
above,  specifically  those  associated  with  the  location  aspect  of  the  OLI  paradigm 
(infrastructure, human capital, economic stability and production costs – cf. Table 2, to the 
institutional approach (corruption, political instability and institutional quality, and financial 
and fiscal incentives – cf. Table 3), and to the ‘New Trade Theory’ - market size, market 
growth, openness of the economy and factor endowments - cf. Table 4)
3 the relations between 
these determinants and FDI flows as reported in the empirical literature will be described 
next.  Note  that,  even  though  all  these  determinants  could  be  embraced  by  the  location 
dimension  of  the  OLI  paradigm  we  have  chosen  to  arrange  them  differently  since  these 
approaches, which have been developed afterwards (Institutional approach and ‘New Trade 
Theory) focus on them.  
3.2. Location dimension of the OLI paradigm 
Because a country that has good quality infrastructure attracts more FDI, (Vijayakumar et al., 
2010), it may be expected that there is a strong relationship between this determinant and 
FDI.  But  the  conclusions  are  not  unanimous  (cf.  Table  2),  since  some  authors  find  a 
significant positive relation (Biswas, 2002; Asiedu, 2006; Mhlanga et al., 2010; Vijayakumar 
et al., 2010), whilst others do not find any statistical evidence that infrastructure attracts FDI 
(Cleeve, 2008; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010). The latter finding may be due to the fact 
that the authors were working with a small scale sample made up of countries with fairly 
similar  features  (e.g.,  SSA;  MENA;  SE).
4  Using  the  number  of  internet  connections  as  a 
proxy Botrić and Škuflić (2006) concluded that the relationship between infrastructure and 
                                                 
3 Root and Ahmed (1978), in their study on the influence of government policy instruments on FDI in the 
industrial sector of the developing countries, propose a separate category for FDI determinants, though with 
elements in common  with the submission associated  with this study, based on 4 aspects: economic, social, 
political and government policy. So as to remain consistent with the theoretical synthesis described in Section 2, 
it was decided to group the empirical determinants using the same conceptual framework. 
4 SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa; MENA: Middle East and North Africa; SE: South-east Europe 8 
 
FDI is negative, and explain this with the fact that the internet only became widespread in 
these countries after 2000. 
Table 2: Summary of FDI determinants associated with the location dimension of the OLI paradigm        
Determinant  FDI destination 
a  Proxy  Method  Effect  Author(s) (year) 
Infrastructure 
16 SSA countries 
No. phone lines per 1000 inhabs 
Multivariate 
regression  0  Cleeve (2008) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs 
  
Panel data 
0  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
22 SSA countries  +  Asiedu (2006) 
44 countries  +  Biswas (2002) 
14 SADC  Multivariate 
regression 
+  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
14 SADC  No. landline and mobile 
subscribers per 1000 inhabs  +  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
6 SE European 
countries  No. internet connections 
Panel data 
-  Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
BRICS  Infrastructure index
b  +  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 
44 countries  Installed net electricity generation 
capacity per capita  +  Biswas (2002) 
Human capital 
16 SSA countries 
Secondary education index  Multivariate 
regression 
+  Cleeve (2008) 
80 DCs  0  Schneider and Frey (1985) 
16 SSA countries  Adult illiteracy  0  Cleeve (2008) 
22 SSA countries  % adult literacy 
Panel data 





0  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 
14 SADC  Multivariate 
regression 
0  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
80 DCs  -  Schneider and Frey (1985) 





22 SSA countries  - - - -        Asiedu (2006) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs 
   Supply + reserve currency  Panel data  0 
Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
14 SADC  Currency/GDP  Multivariate 
regression  -  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs 
   Financial sector development 
index 
Panel data 
+  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
6 SE European 
countries 
+  Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
Unemployment rate  + 
12 MENA 
24 DCs 






regression  -  Schneider and Frey (1985) 
6 SE European 
countries  Panel data 
+ 
Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
Weight of private sector in 
economy  + 
No. privatizations  - 
BRICS  Weighted average of main 
currencies adjusted for inflation  -  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 




+  Cleeve (2008) 
80 DCs 
% external aid Communist 
countries  - 
Schneider and Frey (1985)  % external aid Western countries  + 
% economic and political 




Wage/worker  Panel data 
0  Biswas (2002) 
6 SE European 
countries  -  Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
80 DCs 
Worker remittances and wages 
Multivariate 
regression 
+  Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
BRICS  Panel data  +  Vijayakumar et al. 
(2010) 
Legend: + positive and statistically significant effect; - negative and statistically significant effect; 0 no statistically significant effect; DCs – 
developing countries; SADC – Southern African Development Community 
Note: 
a Country was the unit of analysis for all the studies listed; 
b Indexing for electricity consumption (kWh per capita), energy use (kg of 
oil equivalent per capita), no. phone lines per 100 inhabitants. 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 9 
 
From a more social angle, human capital is found to be a relevant determinant, basically in 
skilled  labour  intensive  sectors  where  the  level  of  education  improves  productivity  and 
facilitates technological innovation (Brooks et al., 2010). So a significant positive relation 
with FDI can be expected. But for this determinant, too, the conclusions do not fully agree (cf. 
Table 2). Significant positive effects have been found (e.g., Asiedu, 2006; Cleeve, 2008), and 
so have inconclusive effects (e.g., Schneider and Frey, 1985; Cleeve, 2008). 
Cleeve (2008) used the secondary school education index (which represents the weight of 
enrolled pupils in the total population of secondary school age) to measure human capital. But 
he found that this proxy did not show the accumulated stock of human capital, and he deemed 
it essential to use adult illiteracy, too, as an indicator of the education and skills level of the 
population. But he did not obtain conclusive results for this indicator either, maybe because of 
the small variability in the illiteracy rates of the countries in the sample. 
A  country  with  stable  economic  and  financial  circumstances  presupposes  general  price 
stability, the maintenance of full employment and balance of payments equilibrium, and a 
country enjoying all these conditions will tend to receive greater FDI inflows (Cleeve, 2008). 
Several indicators are used to measure this determinant (economic and financial stability), 
with the inflation rate being one of the most usual measures since it can gauge price stability, 
which is a condition of economic equilibrium. In this context, high or volatile inflation rates 
are a clear sign of economic instability and may become an impediment to FDI (Botrić and 
Škuflić,  2006).  Balance  of  payments  deficits  likewise  denote  instability  and  can  lead  to 
restrictions on the free movement of capital, thereby hampering the repatriation of profits 
(Schneider and Frey, 1985). 
Botrić  and  Škuflić  (2006),  in  a  study  focused  on  a  group  of  underdeveloped  South-east 
European countries (SE)
5 whose economies were in transition (from being centrally planned), 
had to use proxies that fit these circumstances in order to measure economic stability. So they 
used the weight of the private sector in the economy or the number of privatizations, which 
tend  to  show  the  speed  of  transition  of  the  economies  and  indicate  that  the  market 
mechanisms  are  better  developed.  They  achieved  statistically  significant  results  on  both 
proxies; the effect was found to be positive for the weight of the private sector and negative 
for the number of privatizations, which the authors ascribe to investors being more interested 
in small scale privatizations in these countries. 
                                                 
5 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia. 10 
 
In their analysis of FDI in eighty developing countries (DCs) Schneider and Frey (1985) used 
some  other  proxies,  such  as  the  percentage  of  external  aid  from  Communist  or  Western 
countries and economic and political multilateral aid, which sought to explain how far the 
origin of external aid to those countries could influence their attractiveness. It was found that 
countries  nearest  to  Western  economies  tended  to  attract  more  FDI.  On  the  whole  the 
conclusions suggest, as might be expected, that economic stability has a significant positive 
effect on FDI (cf. Table 2). The most surprising conclusion was drawn by Botrić and Škuflić 
(2006) when they used the unemployment rate as a proxy for economic stability, for which a 
negative effect on FDI was expected, since high unemployment tends to be linked to poorer 
economic stability (Martins, 2005). The positive effect found by the authors may be related to 
the fact that the proxy is more adjusted to a measure of cheap labour, which does attract more 
FDI, than a measure of economic stability, thus distorting the result. 
However, according to Dunning and Lundan (2008) factors such as economic stability are 
often ignored by firms, to the detriment of the goal of trying to improve their competitiveness 
by transferring all or some of their production to places where production costs, especially 
wages, are lower. 
So it may be expected that low wage costs, measured by wage per worker, have a significant 
positive effect on attracting FDI since this leads to lower production costs (Dunning  and 
Lundan,  2008).  This  effect  was  confirmed  by  two  of  the  studies  examined  (cf.  Table  2). 
Contrary  to  expectation,  Botrić  and  Škuflić  (2006)  found  a  negative  relation  of  this 
determinant with FDI, which the authors think might be explained by the sectoral distribution 
of FDI, since, with the services sector being attractive in the South-east European countries 
and wages being higher in this sector, investors may be willing to tolerate higher wages. 
Biswas (2002) did not obtain conclusive results about the relevance of low wage costs to 
attracting FDI. 
3.3. Institutional approach 
Since  the  late  1990s  the  literature  on  economic  development  has  focused  on  institutional 
quality as the chief factor explaining the differences in development between countries, being 
the low levels of corruption associated with greater prosperity (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). 
So  variables  such  as  corruption,  political  instability  and  weak  institutional  quality  are 
included in the ‘institutional’ dimension, and they are expected to have a negative effect on 
FDI determinants (cf. Table 3).  11 
 
Table 3: Summary of FDI determinants associated with the ‘Institutional approach’ 
Determinant  FDI 
destination







16 SSA countries 
Corruption index 
Multivariate 
regression  -  Cleeve (2008) 
12 MENA; 24 
DCs 
   Panel data 
-  Mohamed and Sidiropoulos 
(2010) 
22 SSA countries  - - - -        Asiedu (2006) 
80 DCs 
Type of regime 
Multivariate 
regression  0  Schneider and Frey (1985) 
44 countries  Panel data 
+ 
Biswas (2002) 
Duration of regime  - 
14 SADC 
IIM 




Mhlanga et al. (2010)  ∑ political freedom index, 
civil liberty  0 
16 SSA countries  Average of political and 
civil freedom  0  Cleeve (2008) 
22 SSA countries 
No. of coups d’état 
Panel data 
- - - -       
Asiedu (2006)  No. of assassinations  - - - -       
No. of insurrections  - - - - 
80 DCs  No. of strikes and 
insurrections 
Multivariate 
regression  -  Schneider and Frey (1985) 




+  Biswas (2002) 
22 SSA countries  Effectiveness of rule of law 
(ICRG)  +  Asiedu (2006) 
12 MENA; 24 
DCs  Investment profile 










Root and Ahmed (1978)  Tax incentives ( complexity 
vs. simplicity; liberality)  0 
16 SSA countries 




Cleeve (2008)  Profit repatriation  0 
Tax concessions  0 




Bilateral effective average 
tax rates 
Panel gravity-
model  -  Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) 
Legend: + positive and statistically significant effect; - negative and statistically significant effect; 0 no statistically significant effect. 
Notes: 
a The country was the unit of analysis for all the studies listed; 
b In accordance with the theoretical synthesis in Section 1.1., this group 
of determinants could also be included in the Location dimension of the OLI paradigm; 
c Institutional Investor Magazine – risk rating 
of the receiving country according to figures from September 2009. The higher the rating, the lower the country risk; 
d Calculated in 
accordance with the ICRG (International Country Risk Guide) property rights index, it includes: risk of expropriation; rule of law; 
government  credibility  with  respect  to  honouring  agreements;  bureaucracy,  and  corruption.  The  higher  the  index,  the  better  the 
investment conditions; 
e It includes assessment of the feasibility of the agreement/expropriation, repatriation of profits and delayed 
payments. 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
Institutional reforms are particularly relevant in that they help reduce corruption and offer 
more transparency and security to investors (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007). Most analyses find 12 
 
that  the  effect  of  corruption,  measured  by  the  corruption  index,
6  is  statistically  and 
significantly  negative  in  attracting  FDI  (Asiedu,  2006;  Cleeve,  2008;  Mohamed  and 
Sidiropoulos, 2010). 
With respect to political instability, most studies bear out the negative result expected for this 
determinant in relation to FDI. Nonetheless, Cleeve (2008) and Mhlanga et al. (2010) used 
the political and civil freedom indexes but did not obtain any conclusive results, probably 
because of the small size of the samples. Schneider and Frey (1985) and Biswas (2002) used 
measures  such  as  the  type  and  duration  of  political  regimes,  considering  that  left-wing 
regimes will tend to attract less FDI, given that investors, on average, see them as a greater 
risk and that their duration will tend to have a negative effect, suggesting that the longer-
lasting the political regime in the country, the less attractive it will be for foreign investors. 
Using the country risk rating, Mhlanga et al. (2010) obtained different findings from those 
expected: higher risk countries attract more FDI. According to the authors this conclusion can 
be explained by the fact that there were some countries in the sample, such as Angola, which 
has a high risk but attracts a large amount of FDI, mostly because of its vast endowments of 
natural resources (oil and natural gas, for example). 
The level of corruption and political instability has a considerable influence on a country’s 
institutional  quality,  since  corruption  (defined  as  the  abuse  of  power  for  a  person’s  own 
benefit) (Cleeve, 2008) affects the quality of institutions, and political instability limits its 
development. This is because, when resources are distributed unequally it tends to generate 
revolt (Sahu, 2008) and to restrict the development of more efficient political and economic 
institutions, which constrains FDI. Asiedu (2006) used an indicator taken from the  ICEG 
(International Country Risk Guide) to measure institutional quality, which makes it possible 
to  assess  the  impartiality  of  the  legal  system  and  effective  application  of  the  law 
(effectiveness of the rule of law). Biswas (2002) and Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) used 
composite indexes that contain risk factors for investors, such as bureaucracy, corruption, risk 
of expropriation or profit repatriation policies. All these studies found a significant positive 
relation between institutional quality and FDI. 
Authors such as Halvorsen (1995), Wilson (1996), Osman (2000) and Wells et al. (2001) 
(cited in Cleeve, 2008) argue that corruption problems may be aggravated by the granting of 
                                                 
6  Asiedu  (2006)  and  Mohamed  and  Sidiropoulos  (2010)  used  the  corruption  index  taken  from  the  ICRG 
(International  Country  Risk  Guide),  whilst  Cleeve  (2008)  used  the  CPI  (Corruption  Perceptions  Índex) 
calculated by Transparency International. 13 
 
tax concessions which lead to costs to the receiving country that may outweigh the benefits of 
attracting FDI. The vast literature that focuses on the role of incentives in attracting FDI 
presents results that are not consensual. Using corporate taxation (expressed as percentage of 
profit) as a proxy for financial and economic incentives, Root and Ahmed (1978) concluded 
that it is a significant determinant of FDI in manufacturing. However, using another proxy to 
measure this determinant, the authors found that tax incentives fail systematically to attract 
FDI. Root and Ahmed (1978) explain this seemingly surprising result by the fear that such 
incentives will be removed by host governments once the investment is made. Additionally, 
Cleeve (2008) found no statistically significant effects of financial and fiscal incentives on 
FDI. Cleeve (2008) used three proxies to measure that variable: temporary tax exemptions 
(which are very popular, since lower tax rates translate into higher return); the repatriation of 
profits (indicating that the more liberal this policy, the more FDI will be attracted), and tax 
concessions for certain sectors of activity (showing whether the receiving country is selective 
in the type of  FDI it wants to attract). Regardless of the proxy, Cleeve (2008)  found no 
statistically significant effects of these variables on FDI for the sample of countries studied. 
Finally, Bellak and Leibrecht (2009) conclude that countries with a lower tax rate attract more 
FDI. However, authors enhance that the relative importance of the corporate tax rate must not 
be overemphasized as their results reveal that during the period 1995 to 2003 the tax burden 
had no exceptional influence on FDI when compared to other determinants.  
3.3. New theory of trade 
With  regard  to  FDI  determinants  associated  with  the  New  theory  of  trade  (cf.  Table  4), 
according to the literature (e.g., Asiedu, 2006; Cleeve, 2008; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 
2010), it is expected that market size and growth have a positive effect on FDI. That is to say, 
everything else being given, a larger market and that is growing more will receive larger 
inflows of FDI. 
As a rule, market size has a positive relation with FDI (Vijayakumar et al., 2010), though 
Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) did not get conclusive results when they measured the size 
through number of inhabitants. Using the same proxy, Botrić and Škuflić (2006) found a 
significant  negative  effect,  because  the  sample  of  countries  was  small.  As  far  as  market 
growth is concerned, the empirical results are mixed. Most studies (e.g., Schneider and Frey, 
1985; Cleeve, 2008; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010) found a positive relation, whereas 
Mhlanga et al. (2010) and Vijayakumar et al. (2010) achieved inconclusive results. 14 
 
Table 4: Summary of FDI determinants associated with the ‘New theory of trade’ 
Determinant  FDI destination 
a  Proxy  Method  Effect  Author(s) (year) 
Market size 
16 SSA countries  GDP per capita 
Multivariate 
regression 
+  Cleeve (2008) 




+  Mhlanga et al. (2010)
b 
22 SSA countries 
Panel data 
+  Asiedu (2006) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs  +  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
BRICS  +  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 
6 SE European 
countries 
+ 
Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
No. of inhabitants  Panel data 
- 




GDP growth rate  Multivariate 
regression 
0  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
16 SSA countries  +  Cleeve (2008) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs  Real GDP growth rate  Panel data  +  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
80 DCs  Real GNP growth rate  Multivariate 
regression  +  Schneider and Frey 
(1985) 
BRICS  Industrial production 
index  Panel data  0  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 
Openness of 
the economy 




+  Cleeve (2008) 
14 SADC  +  Mhlanga et al. (2010) 
6 SE European 
countries 
Panel data 
+  Botrić and Škuflić (2006) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs  0  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
BRICS  0  Vijayakumar et al. (2010) 
22 SSA countries  Openness index ICRG





22 SSA countries  X fuels+minerals/total X 
Multivariate 
regression 
+  Asiedu (2006) 
12 MENA; 24 DCs  X fuels/total X  +  Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos (2010) 
14 SADC  Investment in extractive 





Total X  +  Cheung and Qian (2009) 
Eurasia 
Variable= - weak NR 
endowment;  
=1 - moderate; =2 - high 
+  Deichmann et al. (2003) 
Ex-Soviet Union  Industrial production index 
oil+gas 
Panel data  +  Ledyaeva (2009) 
n/a  n/a  Descriptive  n/a  Kumar and Chadha 
(2009) 
Legend: + positive and statistically significant effect; - negative and statistically significant effect; 0 no statistically significant effect. 
Notes: 
a The country was the unit of analysis for all the studies listed; 
b This study considers five other determinants that influence FDI, in 
addition to those mentioned in most other studies. These five are: geographic location; return on investment; origin of FDI; mode of 
entry, and sector of activity. A significant (positive) effect was only found for geographic location and sector of activity, with none of 
the other determinants showing any statistical significance; 
cICRG (International Country Risk Guide) openness index, includes: 
operating risk, taxes, repatriation of profits and labour costs. 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
At the same time, some empirical studies (e.g., Asiedu, 2006; Vijayakumar et al., 2010) argue 
that  the  countries  which  receive  smaller  FDI  inflows  would  be  more  attractive  if  they 
implemented reforms that liberalise their economies (Choong and Lam, 2010), showing the 15 
 
importance of an open economy to attracting FDI. So a positive, statistically significant, effect 
is expected for the variable ‘openness of the economy’ on FDI (Vijayakumar et al., 2010). 
This was corroborated by virtually all the studies (Asiedu, 2006; Botrić and Škuflić, 2006; 
Cleeve, 2008; Mhlanga et al., 2010), whilst in the rest (Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010; 
Vijayakumar et al., 2010) the results were not conclusive. 
Even though the empirical literature suggests the weight of external trade in GDP as a proxy 
for openness of the economy, Asiedu (2006) argues that this relation means that countries that 
want to attract greater FDI inflows ought to increase foreign trade, too. This author feels that 
that recommendation is not constructive, since politicians have no control over trade volume. 
So  it  was  decided  to  use  an  openness  index  based  on  information  from  the  ICRG 
(International Country Risk Guide) reports that take into account factors such as operating 
risk,  level  of  corporation  tax,  profit  repatriation  and  labour  costs,  with  a  statistically 
significant positive effect.  
Firms can increase their competitiveness by investing in certain locations that offer access to 
particular natural resources of better quality and for a lower real cost than in the country of 
origin (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). This motivation is especially important in the case of 
industrial firms since this policy can ensure minimisation of production costs and security of 
sources of supply (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). A statistically significant positive relation is 
thus expected for factor endowments of natural resources and FDI (cf. Table 4). And this was 
confirmed by most of the empirical studies (Deichmann et al., 2003; Asiedu, 2006; Cheung 
and Qian, 2009; Ledyaeva, 2009; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010). However, to Mhlanga et 
al. (2010), who used a dummy variable to measure natural resource endowments in SADC 
countries, the results were not conclusive. 
Asiedu (2006), Cheung and Qian (2009) and Mohamed and Sidiropoulos (2010) used very 
similar proxies to measure natural resource endowments, and the differences are explained by 
the type of natural resources found in the countries they analysed. Specifically, Asiedu (2006) 
used the weight of fuel and mineral exports in total exports since their sample was based on 
Sub-Saharan African nations that have enormous endowments of fuel and minerals. Mohamed 
and Sidiropoulos (2010) only used fuel, because this is the natural resource of relevance in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. Looking at FDI from the standpoint of 
investor country, Cheung and Qian (2009) used a more wide-ranging proxy (including ores, 
too) to represent the demand for sundry raw materials in the various countries. 16 
 
Focusing on the study of Eurasian countries,
7 and controlling for a huge group of factors that 
can influence the attraction of FDI to these countries in the period 1989-1998 (e.g., reform 
measures; weight of the private sector in the economy; GDP and GNP per capita; inflation 
rate; number of years an economy has been under central planning; effectiveness of rule of 
law; investment climate; human and social capital), Deichmann et al. (2003) conclude that the 
endowment of natural resources is a necessary condition for FDI. The authors specifically 
mention the case of countries in Central Asia, rich in oil and natural gas, which would not be 
attractive without these resources.  Ledyaeva (2009) came to a similar conclusion. Analysing 
the countries from the ex-Soviet Union in the period from 1995 to 2005, Ledyaeva (2009) 
confirmed  that  the  regions  with  the  most  abundant  natural  resources,  measured  by  their 
production index for oil and natural gas, attract higher volumes of FDI. 
All  the  empirical  studies  quoted  above  make  use  of  econometric  models  to  assess  the 
relevance of natural resources in attracting FDI in various countries. Only Kumar and Chadha 
(2009)  carried  out  a  comparative  descriptive  study  of  India  and  China  to  find  the  main 
differences in FDI determinants that motivated the two countries, specifically for the steel 
sector. Although  Indian FDI in the extractive industry rose 10% between 2000 and 2004 
(there was almost none in 2000) the authors conclude that natural resources are not the main 
FDI determinant for this country, given that the goal of these firms was to achieve a global 
dimension. Chinese FDI, on the other hand, is clearly aimed at acquiring resources so as to 
secure its of supply natural resources. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The  strong  growth  of  FDI  in  the  last  few  decades  has  led  to  extensive  research  on  the 
determinants  of  this  type  of  investment.  The  vast  amount  of  theoretical  and  empirical 
literature on FDI catalogues a long list of determinants that try to explain direct investment by 
multinational companies in a particular location. Among these determinants the spotlight falls 
on those associated with the location dimension of the OLI paradigm (infrastructure, human 
capital, economic stability and production costs), on the institutional approach (corruption, 
political instability and institutional quality, and financial and fiscal incentives), and on the 
‘New Theory of Trade’ (market size, market growth, openness of the economy and factor 
endowments). 
                                                 
7 Poland, Hungary and the Baltic states. 17 
 
Several empirical studies have been carried out to assess which key determinants explain the 
investment of multinational firms in a given location, but they have not produced consensual 
results. In fact, a large number of studies do not find any statistically significant relation for 
some determinants (e.g., infrastructure, financial and fiscal incentives, market growth, and 
openness of the economy). Furthermore, notwithstanding the quantity and quality of studies 
on FDI determinants, there are some that have been neglected, e.g., human capital, production 
costs and factor endowments (in particular natural resources). 
In addition, it has been confirmed that most of the studies focus on very specific regions and 
countries,  such as Sub-Saharan Africa (Asiedu, 2006), the MENA countries (Mohamed and 
Sidiropoulos,  2010),  China  (Cheung  and  Qian,  2009),  India  (Kumar  and  Chadha,  2009), 
Eurasia  (Poland,  Hungary  and  the  Baltic  states)  (Deichmann  et  al.,  2003),  the  SADC 
(Mhlanga et al., 2010), the nations from the ex-Soviet Union (Ledyaeva, 2009) and BRICS 
(Vijayakumar et al., 2010). Only a very few studies cover a wider range of countries. 
We therefore feel that future empirical work in this area should examine some of the less 
tested determinants (e.g., production costs, natural resource endowments) and could cover 
countries from different regions of the world. 
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